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Perceptual global processing and hierarchically organized affordances – the lack 
of interaction between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action.
Abstract: In visual information processing, two kinds of vision are distinguished: vision-for-perception related to the 
conscious identifi cation of objects, and vision-for-action that deals with visual control of movements. Neuroscience 
suggests that these two functions are performed by two separate brain neural systems – the ventral and dorsal pathways 
(Milner and Goodale, 1995). Two experiments using behavioural measures were conducted with the objective of exploring 
any potential interaction between these two functions of vision. The aim was to combine in one task methods allowing 
for the simultaneous capture of both perceptual global processing and affordance extraction and to check whether they 
infi uence each other. This aim was achieved by employing the paradigms of Navon (1977) and Tucker and Ellis (1998). 
A compound fi  gure was created made up of objects with handles that might or might not have orientation congruent 
between levels. The results revealed that while the affordance effect occurred every time, the Navon effect appeared only 
when subjects focused their attention on object elements responsible for inconsistence within compound fi  gure. Most 
importantly, even when these two effects occurred at once, they had no effect on each other. Results from the study failed 
to confi rm the hypothesis about interaction and gives support to the view that vision-for-perception and vision-for-action 
tend to act as separate systems.
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The current approach to information processing in the 
human brain assumes that these processes operate rather 
together then separately and in a parallel rather than in a 
serial mode. Vision is no exception and at present, it is 
widely agreed that there are two visual functions working 
together: vision for perception and vision for action. One of 
several theories that are based on this idea is the hypothesis 
of Milner and Goodale (1992, 1995) which assumes that 
vision for perception and vision for action are mediated 
by two distinct neuronal systems in the human brain – the 
ventral and dorsal streams. Although the claim that these 
two neural streams might represent two approaches to 
visual cognition (a constructivism approach and a separate 
ecological approach) seems to be rather far-fetched (see 
Norman, 2002, and related comments), the assignment 
of these two distinct functions of vision to the two brain 
systems is valid. According to Milner and Goodale (1995), 
the ventral stream, which runs from the primary visual cortex 
in the occipital lobe to regions in the temporal lobe, deals 
with conscious object recognition and the representation 
of forms. On the other hand, the dorsal stream, which 
runs from the primary visual cortex to the parietal lobe, is 
supposed to act as a visual coordinator for motor activity 
that operates mostly beyond conscious control. 
There is a large body of evidence supporting the theory 
of Milner and Goodale, in most cases demonstrating the 
separation between vision for perception and vision for 
action. Evidence comes from neuropsychology (cases of 
double dissociation and patients with visual agnosia or optical 
ataxia, see Milner and Goodale, 1995), neuroimaging studies 
(Haxby et al., 1994; Culham and Kanwisher, 2001; Grill-
Spector, 2003; Goodale and Westwood, 2004; Shmuelof and 
Zahary 2005; Valyear et al., 2006) and behavioural studies – 
the latter based mainly on the employment of visual illusions 
(Aglioti et al., 1995; Brenner and Smeets, 1996; Bridgeman 
et al., 1997; Haart et al., 1999). In the case of studies using 
visual illusions, some doubts have been expressed (see 
Vishton et al., 1999; Franz et al., 2001). However, it seems 
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that such measures - when used with reservations being 
taken into account - may be considered as fi  rm evidence 
for the dissociation between the functioning of the ventral 
and dorsal streams as postulated by Milner and Goodale’s 
theory (e.g., Króliczak et al., 2006).
The model proposed by Milner and Goodale cannot of 
course avoid criticism, which relates mainly to the issues 
that this model is oversimplifi ed and does not suffi ciently 
explain the way potential interactions between vision for 
perception and vision for action occur (Bruce et al., 2003). 
That there are such interactions, and that these two aspects 
of vision affect each other, we know from studies carried out 
beyond the model of Milner and Goodale (e.g. Craighero et 
al., 1998, Craighero et al., 1999). Neuroanatomical studies 
show that the distinct brain systems discussed are highly 
interconnected (see Dougherty et al., 2005; Pisella et al., 
2006; Mather, 2009). Moreover, many studies, using different 
techniques conducted within the model, demonstrate 
interaction between the functioning of the ventral and dorsal 
streams (e.g., Koshino et al., 2005; Adamo and Ferber, 2009). 
In a recent paper in which Milner and Goodale reviewed the 
current state of their theory (Milner and Goodale, 2008), 
the researchers considered some of the potential interactions 
between the ventral and dorsal streams, but to a very limited 
extent. As we still do not know a great deal about these 
issues on the grounds of Milner and Goodale’s theory, the 
present study intends to explore potential interplays between 
vision for perception and vision for action. To this end, two 
behavioural effects, each representing the functioning of the 
ventral and dorsal streams respectively, are imposed on each 
other in one task.    
In order to activate vision for perception, the perceptual 
effect of global processing is used. This effect was 
discovered by Navon (Navon, 1977). He demonstrated this 
effect using a simple visual stimulus – a large letter made 
of small letters. This compound fi  gure, as it is called, could 
be either congruent or incongruent on both global and local 
levels. Simply speaking, the large letter could be of the 
same type as the small ones that formed it or the large letter 
and small letters might be of two different types. The task 
for participants is very simple: focus attention on one level 
(e.g., large letter) while ignoring the other one and indicate 
which type the target letter is. Navon discovered two things; 
 rstly the processing of the global letter was faster and 
better (less errors) than the local letters and the processing 
of the global level was unchanged, regardless of the letter 
from this level being congruent or incongruent with that 
from the local one. Secondly, when processing the local 
level, the difference between congruent and incongruent 
conditions occurred and was to disadvantage of the latter 
one. Navon concluded that his study demonstrated that 
visual perception can be characterized by global advantage 
effect. This effect consists of two elements represented by 
the above-mentioned results; namely global precedence 
(the whole is processed faster than its parts) and global 
interference (incongruent feature from the global level 
affects processing at the local level but not vice versa).
Since then, many studies have been carried out allowing 
for the determination of the specifi c characteristics and 
limitations of global processing (see Kimchi, 1992; Navon 
2003). Is the Navon effect really an example of ventral 
stream functioning? Firstly, visual grouping by Gestalt 
laws is said to be in the domain of the ventral stream (see 
Goodale and Milner, 1995). The global advantage refers 
to holistic processing and this is why it is often treated as 
being Gestalt in nature. Secondly, as local forms in vision 
are processed by the primary visual cortex (see Braddick et 
al., 2003), the integration of complex patterns, which leads 
to the perception of global structure, takes place in the 
ventral stream and should start in area V4 which is a part 
of ventral pathway (Badcock and Clifford, 2004; Wilson 
and Wilkinson, 1998). Therefore, it seems to be reasonable 
to claim that global precedence and global interference 
might be treated as the results of the functioning of the 
ventral stream. 
Vision for action and the functioning of the dorsal stream 
is represented in the present study by the affordances effect, 
as was demonstrated by Tucker and Ellis (1998). Although 
scientist still dispute what is really meant by affordances 
(see Chemero, 2003; Michaels 2003) in a broad sense, it 
can be said that they are visual information about certain 
objects that inform ‘directly’ an organism about what 
motor actions might be acted upon this object. Thus, one 
seeing a coffee mug on his/her desk is instantly prepared 
(without awareness) to grasp the mug in an appropriate 
way; that is, by its handle. Handle “graspability” is the 
affordance of the coffee mug. In an experiment by Tucker 
and Ellis (1998) participants were presented with pictures 
of everyday objects that could be either in an upright or 
in an upside down position and could had their handles 
orientated either leftwards or rightwards. The task for the 
participants was to indicate by pressing buttons with their 
right or left hand whether the seen object was in a normal 
or an inverted position. The instructions given said nothing 
about handle orientations. Tucker and Ellis showed that 
subjects responded faster and more accurately with the 
hand on the side towards which the handle of the presented 
object was orientated. According to the authors, this result 
demonstrates that visual information about a seen object 
generates and enhances certain motor actions that can be 
performed on these objects even without an intention to act 
upon it. In this case, orientations of graspable handles (to 
the left or to the right) afforded movements of left or right 
hand respectively. Affordances were also demonstrated with 
methods other than behavioural ones. Grèzes and Decety 
(2002) were able to demonstrate with the PET method that 
regions which are part of the dorsal stream are also activated 
when one looks at some objects and does not perform any 
action on them nor has any intention to do so. The authors 
conclude that motor representations of seen objects are 
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present even though there are no actual visually guided 
movements related to that objects. In addition, Valyear et 
al. (2006), using the fMRI technique, demonstrated that the 
functioning of the dorsal stream was associated with the 
visual control of actions directed to seen objects. Rizzolatti 
and co-workers (1997), and Fagg and Arbib (1998), suggest 
that the cortex regions AIP and F5, which belong to the 
dorsal stream in the brain, are responsible for extracting 
possible affordances from objects in view. Affordances are 
then connected to the functioning of the dorsal stream and 
are examples of vision-for-action.
The aim of the current study is to explore the relations 
between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action by 
combining global precedence effect and the affordance 
effect in one task. These two effects representing the two 
functions of vision and revealed by two elegant paradigms 
of behavioural studies, appear to create a great opportunity 
for studying potential interactions between the two aspects 
of vision. In order to achieve this goal, a compound fi  gure 
is generated that hierarchically (i.e., on both the global 
and local level) organizes objects with features capable of 
eliciting affordances. These affordances might be either 
consistent or inconsistent between two levels. Such stimulus 
provides the conditions for the occurrence of Navon as well 
as the affordance effect simultaneously.
Two possible outcomes are considered; if the combination 
of these two effects works similarly as in experiments with 
‘grasping visual illusions’ the two effects should occur 
simultaneously without any infi uence on each other. This 
would support the hypothesis regarding the functional 
separation of the two systems for vision. Alternatively, if 
the planned imposition of Navon and the affordance effects 
allows potential interaction between vision for perception 
and vision for action to be tracked – then the following 
situations are possible. Firstly, both effects infl uence each 
other, hence they both occur, although in slightly changed 
form (e.g., they will be inverted), or they will both cancel 
themselves – each effect will disappear. Another case might 
be that one effect affects the other one – in that condition 
one effect will have its normal form while the other will 
have a different form. This type of result would help to 
determine, to some extent, the possible directions and 
degree of interactions between vision for perception and 
vision for action - the interactions that are not provided for 
by the theory of Milner and Goodale. The study is aimed at 
verifying the hypothesis stated above.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Thirty-four participants took part in 
Experiment 1 (17 women and 17 men, mean age was 21.32, 
age ranged from 19 to 28). All participants were students 
from the Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities 
campus in Wrocław. Students participated in Experiment 
1 for credit points or as volunteers at the experimenter’s 
request. All had normal or corrected to normal vision and 
were naïve regarding the purpose of the experiment. 
Apparatus and stimuli. 
The experiment was run on a PC computer with a 21” 
LCD monitor (60 Hz refreshing rate). Program E-Prime 
2.0 Professional® was used for presenting all instructions, 
stimuli, and recording reaction times and correct answers. 
During the experiment participants sat alone in front of 
the computer in a darkened room. The distance between 
the screen and the face was approximately 80cm. The 
hierarchically organized    fi  gure (compound stimuli) 
employed in Experiment 1 was prepared by the experimenter 
for the purposes of this experiment. An example of 
a stimulus is shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Compound fi  gure used in Experiment 1 and 2. This example 
stimulus shows a case of congruency between levels. On both global and 
local levels (large and small cups), cup handles are orientated rightwards 
and both large and small cups are in the upright position.
The stimulus was a two-dimensional drawing of a large 
cup comprised of 30 little cups. The large cup (global 
level) was app. 13.05° x 9.6° of visual angle in size and 
the little ones (local level) were app. 1.5° x 1.3°. Each 
cup on each level (global or local) could have their grasp 
handle orientated either leftwards or rightwards. At the 
same time, each cup on each level could be in one of two 
possible positions: normal or upside down. This means 
that the combination of all these conditions gives 16 types 
of compound stimuli with different pairs of consistency, 
either of orientation or of position. The full list of all types 
of compound stimuli can be found in the Appendix.
The cup, as the graspable object employed in this 
experiment, was introduced for practical reasons, i.e., 
it was easier to design a responding device for such an 
object. The compound stimuli used in this study have one 
additional characteristic that objects used in other studies 
were lacking. The large fi  gure (a cup at the global level) has 
its own contour, making it a distinctive object on its own. 
Such manipulation of compound stimuli is not entirely in 
line with suggestions about what the hierarchical organized 
figure should look like (see Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 2003). 
The reasons for the introduction of such an alternation was to 
ensure that the global fi  gure would be clearly distinguished 
and independent of its local parts and would be a single 
autonomous object with its own self-containing affordance. 
Authenticated | 178.180.3.75
Download Date | 11/22/12 10:48 AM
154 Piotr Styrkowiec, Edward Nęcka
Because of the outline of the shape of the global cup, it 
was assumed that its representation would be enhanced and 
so would be its affordance. A  fi  nal argument in favour of 
using a large fi  gure with its own contour is that compound 
stimuli designed in this manner resemble objects from real 
life, where some complex things with many parts may 
have one affordance for the whole object, and many other 
affordances connected with its small parts. 
Procedure. 
Experiment 1 used repeated measure design within 
subjects. All participants went through 4 blocks, run in a 
random order; each block consisted of training (16 trials) 
and a testing phase. In the testing phase, all 16 types of 
compound  fi  gures were randomly shown 8 times which 
gives 128 trials per block. There was one general instruction 
displayed on the screen before the whole experiment that 
explained to the participant the procedure they should follow. 
Their task was to indicate with the right or the left hand 
whether a particular object – a large or a small cup – was 
in a normal or an upside down position. Participants were 
asked to work as fast and as accurately as possible. Before 
each block, precise instructions were given with detailed 
information about the task and the proper response to it. 
Every instruction remained on the screen as long as each of 
the participants wanted it. The instruction for the particular 
task was to look either at the position of a large cup or at the 
position of a little one. Target objects were assigned colours 
depending on the task condition (i.e. “If a large fi  gure is an 
object in a normal position please press red, if it is upside 
down please press green”). There were two types of answer 
mappings – either the left hand response was assigned for 
the normal and the right hand response for the upside down 
position of the cup at a particular level, or it was assigned 
the other way round – the left hand response for the upside 
down position and the right hand response for the normal 
one. Response-to-hand mappings were counterbalanced. 
This combination of two levels and two types of response 
gives 4 task kinds, and 4 blocks respectively. 
Participants gave their responses with their index fi  ngers 
using a special ‘black box’, a device especially made by the 
experimenter for this experiment (see Figure 2). 
In a cardboard box pasted over with matt black paper, 
a standard QWERTY keyboard was hidden of which the 
participants were unaware. The keyboard in the box was 
in a vertical position with its upper side (buttons) facing 
the computer screen. Hence, the keys were on the opposite 
side of the box from the point of view of the participant. 
Semi-circular holes were cut on both far ends of the box in 
the front and back. At the back of the box, the holes were 
in locations were the keys ‘~’ and ‘-‘are, on the far left 
and far right respectively. The holes were positioned so the 
participant could comfortably lay their hands on the table 
and put their index fi  ngers (fi nger of the left hand on the 
left side, right hand fi  nger on the right) into the holes at 
the back of the box and their thumbs into the holes on the 
front side of the’ black box’. While keeping both fi  ngers 
of both hands in the holes, the buttons could be pressed 
by small movements of the index fi  ngers. Participants kept 
their fi  ngers in the holes throughout the whole experiment. 
Above each hole in the front of a box, a small colour sticker 
was affi xed – red on the left side and green on the right. The 
stickers marked the answer buttons. The alignment of the 
 fingers in the holes was intended to mimic the type of hand 
movement needed for holding a cup by its handle. According 
to the literature (Craighero et al., 1999), keeping the hand 
in a certain position is associated with the preparation of a 
certain movement in advance, which in turn infi uences the 
perception of the affordances of the viewed object related 
to that movement. Thus, it is thought that the hand position 
applied in this experiment will enhance affordances. 
Participants were asked not to cross their hands, 
nor to turn the ‘black box’ around. Each trial consisted 
of a sequence of the following events. First, for 700ms 
a  fi xation point (a little black cross in the middle of the 
white background) was shown. Next, the compound 
stimuli were shown. The stimuli remained on the screen 
until the participant gave his/her response or until  1500ms 
had passed. If the participant responded in a specifi ed 
time, the feedback information was displayed on a white 
background. All feedback information was displayed in 
black ink. If the participant did not respond in a given time, 
a message saying ‘no answer’ was shown. The information 
about performance stayed on the screen for 1000ms. After 
that, a new trial started.
Results
As was mentioned above, there were actually two 
kinds of incongruence between the objects from the global 
and local levels within the 16 types of compound stimuli 
used in Experiment 1. In particular, large and small cups 
could differ between levels either with their position 
(upward or inverted) or with handle orientation (leftward 
or rightward). Object position factor was one that was 
relevant for the participants’ task, who as subjects had to 
decide whether the cup at a particular level is in normal 
or upside down position. However, this factor is irrelevant 
Figure 2.A. Device response (the “black box”) used in Experiment 1 and 
2. B. Left hand position when responding with the “black box”. 
BA
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for the affordances problem studied here. Thus, the only 
cases taken into account for analysis are those when there 
is only one type of incongruence - namely that of handle 
orientations. Therefore, in the following analysis only data 
from these trials from Experiment 1 were included where 
the following types of compound stimuli were presented 
(according to the list from the Appendix): 1-4 and 9-12. 
It needs to be emphasised that due to the task demands of 
Experiment 1, the incongruence that is being analysed here 
refers to that stimulus feature which participants did not 
direct their attention towards.
Before running the analysis results for RTs, the 
accuracy rates were tested (with K-S test) to check if they 
were normally distributed. It turned out that in the case of 
accuracy results they were not normally distributed (p=.05). 
There was a “ceiling effect” – almost all the participants 
achieved relatively high scores (app. 95%). Because of this, 
results for accuracy rates were not included in the analysis.  
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy for 16 conditions of data analysis from 
Experiment 1. 
Condition
Reaction times 
(milliseconds)
Accuracy (percentage of 
correct responses)
mean              SD       mean SD
Global level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Global level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations 
Local level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Local level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations 
Local level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Local level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
For all conditions N=34
527.11
513.79
534.77
538.72
536.80
530.16
507.86
514.22
580.41
577.46
582.95
588.09
594.57
606.69
572.16
582.79
66.83
72.18
76.51
77.26
80.55
75.48
66.70
75.59
71.27
61.36
77.34
73.36
80.54
74.67
71.89
72.30
0.97
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.97
0.98
0.97
0.98
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.98
0.98
0.054
0.058
0.062
0.078
0.064
0.090
0.044
0.045
0.072
0.062
0.045
0.079
0.054
0.052
0.048
0.069
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Means for reaction times (RTs) from selected conditions 
(see above) of all the participants were submitted to 
repeated measure ANOVA within participants. There were 
four independent variables with each having two levels, 
which gives 16 experimental conditions all exercised by 
every participant. These variables were as follows: Level at 
which target object was located (global vs. local), Hand of 
Response (left vs. right), Handle Orientation of target object 
(left vs. right) and Congruency between global and local 
level handles orientation (congruent vs. incongruent).
Response time. There was main effect of Level, 
F(1,33)=44.511, MSE=11078.13, p<.001, η2=.57,  that is 
participants were faster when responding to target stimuli 
from the global level compared with responses to stimuli 
from the local level. ANOVA revealed also two interactions. 
One was an almost signifi cant interaction between the Level 
and Hand of Response, F(1,33)=4.092, MSE=1439.67, 
p=.051, η2=.11. When answering at the global level 
participants were faster than at the local level. At the global 
level, the right hand responses were slightly quicker than 
responses with the left hand. At the local level, this was 
reversed, although these differences between the responses 
of hands at each level were not signifi cant as the post hoc 
analysis revealed (see Fig. 3). Basically, this interaction 
re ects the described above effect of the Level factor. 
  
Figure 3. Interaction between the Level and the Hand of Response for 
mean reactions times (F(1,33)=4.092, p=0.051) from Experiment 1.
The second interaction was between Hand of Response 
and Handle Orientation, F(1,33)=21.78, MSE=1829.9, 
p<.001, η2=.40, demonstrating the typical affordance effect 
– when the hand of response matched the orientation of the 
cup handle, responses were faster compared to situations 
where there was no such correspondence (Fig. 4). Responses 
with the right hand were faster than those with the left hand 
when the object had its handle orientated rightwards; left 
hand responses were faster than right ones when the target 
object handle was orientated leftwards. This is the so-called 
affordances effect – the unattended visual feature of the 
object triggers motor responses corresponding with that 
aspect of the seen object. 
Figure 4. Interaction between the Handle Orientation and the Hand 
of Response for mean reaction times (F(1,33)=21.78, p< .001) from 
Experiment 1.
Discussion
Firstly, it should be highlighted that Experiment 1 
revealed very robust affordance effects similar to that of 
Tucker and Ellis (1998). When participants saw drawings 
of the cup with its handle orientated toward a particular 
side, the hand on that side was more quickly prepared to 
perform motor action, even though the task was not to 
make a quick response in relation to handle orientation. 
Unattended (to some extent) features of the seen objects 
afford certain actions, even though these actions are 
unintended. This gives support to the claim that affordances 
are real phenomenon. Vision of an object contains necessary 
information needed for motor actions that is processed 
directly, though in parallel manner, with the processing of 
information about the identity of the object. This particular 
effect of Experiment 1 demonstrates the function of vision 
for action - when watching a graspable object the features 
that relate to motor actions (that can be acted upon that 
object) infi uence movements of the person observing that 
object, even though these features are not consciously 
attended. Of course, in Experiment 1 affordances were 
enhanced by a particular hand position while responding. 
This was the utilisation of a mechanism in which motor 
actions in turn affect the mechanism of perception. The 
experimental manipulation was thus effective. 
Considering vision for perception, the methods used 
here were thought to enhance and elicit the Navon effect but 
this occurred only in a limited manner. Information from the 
global level was processed faster than that from the local 
one. This result indicates perceptual global precedence 
in perceptual processing as postulated by Navon (1977), 
which is assumed as an attribute of vision for perception. 
However, the second aspect of the advantage of global 
processing in visual perception namely, global interference 
was not found in Experiment 1. Perceptual incongruence 
between levels had no effect. Perceptual difference from 
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the global level did not affect performance when the object 
at local level was attended and processed. In other words, 
perceptual information from the global level did not disrupt 
the processing of information from the local level when 
these two were incongruent. 
In Experiment 1, there was no interference between 
affordances from different levels. The incongruence of 
the handles’ orientation between levels did not affect the 
relation of the hand of response with the handle orientation. 
That is the orientation of the cup handle from the global 
level had no affect whatsoever on the reaction time of the 
hand of response when the participant was responding to the 
target at a local level. This means that in these conditions 
there was no interaction between vision for perception and 
vision for action represented by the Navon effect and the 
affordances effects. 
Therefore, although Experiment 1 managed to elicit and 
demonstrate the affordance effect and perceptual global 
precedence, it failed to obtain perceptual and affordances 
interference. One potential element responsible for this 
might be a factor of directing attention to particular features 
of seen objects. The next experiment was developed to 
verify this claim. 
Experiment 2
This experiment was set up to test whether perceptual 
global interference and interference of affordances between 
levels would occur in a situation, when visual attention 
is directed to object features that are responsible for 
incongruence within a compound fi  gure. In other words, 
interference should occur within a hierarchically organised 
 figure, when there is only one kind of inconsistency and 
elements of the compound object in view related to that 
inconsistency are in the focus of attention. In the previous 
experiment, there were two types of incongruence namely 
the position of the cup and handle orientation and participants 
directed their attention to the fi  rst element (cup position 
– upright or inverted). Here, global and local objects could 
differ only with handle orientation (i.e. affordance element) 
and the subject’s task was to focus their attention on that 
particular feature. 
Method
Participants. Thirty-four participants took part in the 
Experiment 2 (17 women and 17 men, mean age was 21.85, 
age ranged from 19 to 31). All participants were students 
from Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities 
campus in Wrocław or their friends. Students participated 
in the experiment for credit points or as volunteers at the 
experimenters’ request. All had normal or corrected to 
normal vision and were not informed about the purpose of 
the experiment. None of the participants had taken part in 
the previous experiment. 
Apparatus and stimuli. These were exactly the same 
as in Experiment 1, except for the number of types of 
compound stimuli (see Appendix). In this experiment only 
4 types were used; those where cups that on both levels 
were in the upright position and they could differ between 
levels only by the handles’ orientation. In other words, 
incongruence in the hierarchically organized  fi gure is 
limited now only to the difference of affordances (different 
cup handle orientations, whereas the cup position is always 
normal). In Experiment 2, stimuli with numbers 1 to 4 from 
the list of stimuli types from the Appendix were used.
Procedure. There was a new kind of task in Experiment 
2. Now participants were asked not about the position 
of a cup at a certain level but were instructed to indicate 
whether a cup at a particular level had its handle orientated 
left or right. They were asked to do that by pressing either 
the red button in the ‘black box’ or the green one. There 
were 4 blocks (two levels which participants should attend 
and two types of key assignment). Each block consisted of 
44 trials (every type of compound fi  gure was repeated 11 
times in random order).
Results
Data processing and analysis were in all respects 
identical to the previous experiment. Once more, in the 
case of accuracy rates results the “ceiling effect” occurred. 
Because of this, these results were not taken into account 
in analysis.
Response times. Two main effects were signifi cant. 
There was the main effect of Level, F(1,33)=165.636, 
MSE=7552.58, p<.001, η2=.83, participants were faster in 
their responses when answering stimulus from the global 
level. This indicates the global precedence effect. There was 
also the main effect of the congruency of handles orientation 
between levels, F(1,33)=31.881, MSE=1137.30, p<.001, 
η2=.49. Responses times were shorter when there was a 
congruency compared with the situation when there was no 
consistency of cup handles between levels. There were also 
three signi cant interactions. The fi  rst one was that of the 
Hand of response and Handle Orientation, F(1,33)=83.508, 
MSE=11764.94, p<.001, η2=.72 (presented in Fig. 5), 
which demonstrates the affordance effect when the response 
is faster if orientation of the cup handle corresponds to the 
hand of response. 
The second interaction was between the Level and 
Congruency of the cup handles’ orientation between levels, 
F(1,33)=29.741, MSE=1131.36, p<.001, η2=.47, this 
interaction is shown in Figure 6. Participants were faster 
when responding to the global level than to the local one 
and the response rates were comparable in cases whether or 
not there was a congruency of cup handles. With reaction 
times at the local level, however, the congruency of cup 
handles differentiated results. In the cases with incongruent 
handles, response times were much longer than those 
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Condition
Table 2. Means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy for 16 conditions of data analysis from 
Experiment 2.
Reaction times 
(milliseconds)
Accuracy (percentage of 
correct responses)
mean              SD       mean SD
Global level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Global level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Global level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations 
Local level, Left hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Local level, Left hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations 
Local level, Right hand, Leftward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
Local level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Congruence of handle orientations
Local level, Right hand, Rightward handle orientation, 
Incongruence of handle orientations
For all conditions N=34
396.93
395.00
469.30
472.96
461.18
464.08
393.26
391.02
458.94
497.32
553.47
586.17
564.97
595.22
464.01
490.91
65.08
59.42
103.99
92.53
103.99
90.08
57.20
48.51
81.18
82.69
106.03
102.20
106.96
102.24
88.30
74.43
0.97
0.99
0.97
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.99
0.99
1
0.95
0.95
0.86
0.96
0.89
0.99
0.95
0.041
0.026
0.073
0.106
0.057
0.074
0.022
0.037
0
0.174
0.087
0.206
0.073
0.201
0.037
0.168
Authenticated | 178.180.3.75
Download Date | 11/22/12 10:48 AM
Perceptual global processing and hierarchically organized affordances – the lack of interaction between vision-for-perception... 159
with congruent handles. This interaction demonstrates the 
perceptual global interference effect.
The third interaction was between the Level and the 
Hand of response, F(1,33)=4.703, MSE=869.279, p<.05, 
η2=.12, reaction times for both hands were faster at the 
global level than at the local one (see Fig. 7). When giving 
their responses at the global level participants were slightly 
faster with their right hands than with their left hands, at 
the local level this was reversed, though these differences 
between the hands of response were not signifi cant as post 
hoc analysis revealed.
Discussion
Navon’s effect – the advantage in processing of 
perceptual global information – was revealed (with RTs 
results). This means that apart from global precedence 
global interference was also demonstrated. Perceptual 
information from the global level, if different from that 
from the local level, distorted the processing of the latter. 
Experimental manipulation was effective. The limitation 
of incongruence types in compound stimuli and directing 
attention straight to the features of hierarchically organised 
stimuli, which may generate inconsistency within these 
stimuli, allowed the robust effect of perceptual global 
advantage to be demonstrated. 
RTs in Experiment 2 showed the affordances effect, 
in which particular visual information (in this case the 
orientation of the cup handle) enhanced certain motor 
reaction (here response with the hand corresponding to the 
handle orientation) related to that feature of the seen object. 
One may object that in the experiment described above the 
effect obtained was not exactly the same as that of Tucker 
and Ellis (1998) because here participants directly attended 
and processed with awareness those features of seen objects 
that were responsible for eliciting affordances. However, 
it seems to be reasonable to think that such processing of 
visual information does not exclude or reject the possibility 
of affordance to operate. Affordances of course are 
understood in this way - that some features of seen objects 
enhance motor actions related to these features without the 
conscious processing of this relation. However, the results 
obtained in this experiment (where participants looked 
directly at the handles orientation and used that information 
for task solving only) confi rm the stance that the brain 
uses visual information for the preparation of particular 
movements. This is the case because the participants 
did not realize that the main purpose of the task was to 
measure whether a particular object orientation may make 
movements with the corresponding hands quicker. Thus, in 
our opinion the affordance effect from the Experiment 2, 
although not entirely in line with the paradigm of Tucker 
and Ellis, can be accepted as an example of mechanisms of 
vision for action.
Most important of all is that while these two effects 
(global advantage and affordances) are present, there is no 
Figure 5. Interaction between the Handle Orientation and the Hand 
of Response for mean reaction times (F(1,33)=83.508, p< .001) from 
Experiment 2.
Figure 6. Interaction between the Level and the Congruency of the cup 
handles’ orientation between levels (F(1,33)=29.741, p< .001) from 
Experiment 2.
Figure 7. Interaction between the Level and the Hand of Response for 
mean reaction times (F(1,33)=4.703, p< .05) from Experiment 2.
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interaction between them. Perceptual global advantage does 
not affect affordance processing and vice versa. It seems to 
be sensible to put forward a claim that these two effects 
are independent of each other. This is also supported by 
the results from the previous experiment. Perceptual global 
advantage and affordance effects seem neither to interfere 
nor cooperate and they do not lead to the emergence of 
any additional or new effect. One needs to bear in mind, 
however, that the separation of vision for perception and 
vision for action, as represented by these two effects, takes 
place in a particular condition of strengthening the effect 
of affordances through positioning the hands in a specifi c 
manner and preparing them for specifi c movements which 
reciprocally affects the processing of visual information.
It appears that the crucial factor for the occurrence of 
global interference is directing attention to these features 
of objects creating compound stimuli that are strictly 
connected to possible inconsistency within those compound 
stimuli. Thus, before moving to a general discussion of 
conclusions that can be drawn from the results of this study, 
one additional analysis need to be considered. 
Supplementary analysis of data from Experiment 1
In Experiment 2, where there was only one type of 
incongruence within compound stimuli (i.e., handles 
orientation), and the participants directed their attention 
to that object characteristic, the data analysis revealed 
the full Navon effect – both global precedence and global 
interference occurred. However, analysis of selected cases 
from Experiment 1, where the only incongruence present 
was that of the handles’ orientation but participants directed 
their attention to other features of the observed objects, 
showed that the perceptual effect of global advantage did 
not occur. Thus, the following analysis is aimed to see 
whether the perceptual effect of global advantage shows 
up when only these cases from Experiment 1 are taken into 
account where the only incongruence is the one to which 
participants devoted their attention, namely inconsistency 
related to the position of objects (upright or inverted) 
According to the list of types of compound stimuli 
from the Appendix for the following analysis of trials from 
Experiment 1, stimuli with odd numbers from that list were 
selected. In all these cases of compound stimuli only one 
type of incongruence is possible – that of position of the cup 
(normal or upside down). Orientation of handles on both 
levels is always the same. Additionally in this analysis, only 
two independent variables were considered because only 
their interaction demonstrates the full Navon effect. These 
variables were the Level of directing attention (global or 
local) and the Congruency of cup position between levels 
(present or absent). 
RTs data from selected trials were submitted to two-
way ANOVA.
Results
Response times. All main effects and the interaction 
were signifi cant. There was the main effect of Level, 
F(1,33)=78.421, MSE=2507.42, p<.001, η2=.7, showing 
that participants were faster when responding to objects at 
the global level. This is the global precedence effect. The 
main effect of Congruence was signifi cant F(1,33)=28.118, 
MSE=544.19, p<.001, η2=.46, and showed that participants 
were faster with their responses when there was a 
congruency of cup position between levels compared to the 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy for 4 conditions of supplementary analysis of 
data from Experiment 1.
Reaction times 
(milliseconds)
Accuracy (percentage of 
correct responses)
mean              SD       mean SD
Global level, Congruence of cup positions
Global level, Incongruence of cup positions
Local level, Congruence of cup positions
Local level, Incongruence of cup positions
For all conditions N=34
526.66
527.60
582.43
623.92
66.85
63.39
68.16
57.67
0.96
0.96
0.97
0.95
0.043
0.041
0.045
0.059
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situation when such congruency was absent. There was also 
the interaction of Level and Congruency, F(1,33)=33.608, 
MSE=415.87, p<.001, η2=.5 (see Fig. 8). The pattern of 
results evidently demonstrates the full Navon effect – global 
precedence and global interference.
Discussion
Even though the revealed effects only come from RTs 
measures, the results of the above analysis along with the 
results from previous experiments support the claim stated 
earlier. This is the full perceptual global advantage effect 
consisting of global precedence and global interference 
occurs only when attention is directed to the features of 
objects creating the compound stimuli, which features are 
responsible for possible perceptual inconsistency within that 
hierarchically organized fi  gure and no other incongruence 
is present. At the same time, this result suggests that the 
perceptual global advantage effect might not be located at 
the early stages of perceptual processing, as was postulated 
in literature on that topic (e.g. Kimchi, 1992). This will be 
discussed in more details in the fi  nal remarks below. 
General discussion
The conducted experiments provided results that 
together present a reasonably coherent picture, showing 
that there is no interaction between vision-for-perception 
and vision-for-action, at least in the particular case of 
the imposition of two effects representing these two 
visual functions. There is no interaction between global 
advantage, consisting of global precedence and global 
interference, with the affordance effect in conditions when 
the particular hand movement relating to that affordance 
is pre-programmed by certain  fi  nger alignments. These 
two effects in this setting seem to occur separately without 
any clear and overt mutual infl uence. Let us fi  rst in turn 
discuss the occurrence of these effects on their own in the 
experiments described above.
In both experiments the affordances effect did occur. 
This means that the observed objects and their features 
enhanced particular motor actions that could act on these 
objects. It happened both when participants directly 
focused their attention on the attributes of objects that were 
responsible for eliciting affordances (Experiment 2), and 
more importantly, when participants’ attention was directed 
to other features of these objects (Experiment 1). Thus, these 
results lend support to the notion that the method introduced 
by Tucker and Ellis (1998) is an effective and valid way of 
testing affordances. The obtained results also support the 
idea that affordances exist in the real world – objects in 
view automatically (without conscious awareness) activate 
and strengthen the motor actions that can be performed 
on that objects. The visual system treated as a whole, 
while processing information needed for recognition of 
seen objects, simultaneously and in parallel extracts data 
required for the preparation of motor programme (i.e., how 
to interact with those objects). In other words, the results of 
the experiments discussed above demonstrate vision-for-
action ‘in action’.
It is worthwhile to draw attention to the fact that 
the affordances effects were obtained in the described 
experiments by the employment of two-dimensional 
drawings of objects. In the literature, it is suggested that 
photos are usually better for attaining affordances effects 
than drawings (e.g., Hibi and Yokosawa, 2007) or that 
if drawings are used, they should at least generate an 
impression of depth (Symes et al., 2007). It is possible, 
however, that affordances effects were obtained here with 
2D drawings because they were constantly reinforced by 
the hand position while participants gave responses. This 
issue of the fi  ngers’ alignment will be brought up again 
below, when dealing with the lack of interaction between 
the effects of global advantage and affordances.
When discussing the second effect, global perceptual 
processing, which is thought to be an example of the 
functioning of vision-for-perception, the results of the 
experiments performed do not provide such clear-cut 
conclusions as with the affordances effect. In all cases, 
there was an effect of global precedence – perceptual 
information from the global level of compound stimuli 
was processed faster than information from the local 
level. The full Navon effect, i.e., the situation where 
processing of local level information is impaired by global 
level information, occurred only in specifi c conditions. In 
particular, it was only present when participants’ attention 
was overtly directed to these features of objects building up 
hierarchically organized stimuli that were directly connected 
to the possible incongruence within the compound fi  gure. 
When participants were not focusing their attention on the 
aspects that were related to consistency or inconsistency 
of compound stimulus, then the global interference effect 
Figure 8. Interaction between the Level and the Congruency of the cup’s 
position between levels for mean reaction times (F(1,33)=33.608, p< 
.001) from supplementary data analysis from Experiment 1.
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disappeared. Therefore, the collected results strongly 
support the conclusion that, in order to obtain global 
interference effect, attention needs to be overtly orientated 
toward these aspects of the compound  fi  gure which 
determine congruency or incongruency within this kind 
of stimulus. This conclusion is somewhat in line with the 
results of the experiments by Paquet and Merikle (1988). 
These researchers showed that the processing of global 
information, which comes from objects presented near the 
object at the global level of compound stimulus, is limited 
when this information falls beyond the attention of the 
perceiving subjects. Although they used different methods 
compared to that employed in the presented experiments, 
it seems reasonable to state that the perceptual global 
interference effect probably requires conscious processing 
of aspects of the compound fi  gure’s inconsistency, or at least 
directing overt attention to them. This in turn may indicate 
however, that global interference effect cannot be located at 
the early stages of perceptual processing. This is in contrast 
to conclusions drawn by Miller and Navon (2002), based on 
their study using EEG, in which researchers claimed they 
managed to demonstrate that lateralized readiness potentials 
(LRP), related to the preparation of hand movements, are 
evoked by the stimulus assigned to it, presented at the 
global level but not by stimuli from the local level. Authors 
interpreted their results in this way that part of the global 
processing occurs before the reaction is prepared and thus 
it suggests that global advantage is generated at the early 
stages of perceptual processing. Alternatively, it may be that 
this connection is mediated by the factor of orientation of 
attention. It is possible that when the participants’ attention 
were directed to features of compound stimuli that were not 
related to inconsistency within this stimuli, the relationship 
between LRP and global information might not appear and 
it might be impossible to generate such an assignment. This 
research did not make it possible to determine whether it 
is attention that plays a crucial role in this problem, and 
it seems legitimate to combine the method of Miller and 
Navon with that of this experiment, in order to further 
explore the issue of where exactly in perceptual processing 
the global advantage takes place.
The most important result of the conducted 
research demonstrates that even if the effect of global 
interference does turn up in particular conditions, it has 
no apparent infl uence on affordances effects. That is when 
hierarchically organized stimuli are presented and have 
different affordances at different levels, and these features 
are simultaneously aspects of the compound stimuli that 
constitute its incongruence (which causes in turn perceptual 
global interference) no interaction of affordances occurs. 
This means that such condition does not induce the 
affordance from global level to interfere with the processing 
of affordance from the local level. It seemed reasonable to 
assume that if the coexistence of affordances, demonstrated 
in other studies (see below), leads to their interference (i.e. 
impairment of the processing of activated affordance by 
other affordance presented simultaneously) then in the case 
when some perceptual mechanism like the Navon effect, 
imposes aspects of viewed objects on each other, this also 
will impose affordances and thus will cause distortion in 
their processing. The results obtained, however, showed 
that this was not the case and that this expectation was not 
justifi ed.
As mentioned before, several researchers demonstrated 
the interference between affordances being presented at 
once, which corresponds to situations from the real world. 
Furthermore, such interference was also shown to exist 
between the global and local level. Vainio et al. (2007) 
provided evidence that ignored affordance from the global 
level affects that from the local level. This occurs, however, 
only when these two affordances are components of one 
meaningful object. Hence, the shape of an apple as an 
affordance infl uences one’s motor action when grasping 
the attached apple’s stalk. Even though there is interference 
between affordances from different levels, it is clear that in 
experiments described in this paper the situation is de  nitely 
different. As is pointed out by Gentilucci (2002), in the 
case of the apple and its stalk, there are two affordances 
and thus two potential motor actions but they relate to 
the same individual object. In the experiments presented 
here, the global cup and local cups were different objects 
and the affordances of these cups did not belong to one 
unitary object, but to distinct and separable objects. Hence, 
it seems to be sensible to refer rather to experiments where 
interference between affordances was demonstrated with 
independent objects presented at the same time, when one 
object was the target and the other one was the distractor. 
The basic question is why other researchers managed to 
capture interference between affordances in their studies 
while in our experiments this effect did not occur.
It seems that two factors may a play role. The  rst one is 
attention1.  It is noted (Tipper et al., 1997; Ellis et al., 2007) 
that interference between affordances of the target object 
and the distractor occurs most rarely when the observer’s 
attention is focused on the target object and the motor 
action related to this target object’s affordance is acted on. 
It means that, when someone is not dividing their attention 
between different objects that have different affordances, 
and focuses only on one, which becomes the goal of one’s 
action, it is very likely that only the affordance of this 
1 When discussing the problem of the lack of the Navon effect a few paragraphs earlier, attention was also mentioned but it was understood as object-
based attention. Here, when talking about the lack of interference of affordances between levels of compound stimuli, space-based attention is called 
for and ‘blamed’. It is interesting to ask whether this study, after some modifi cations, allows for exploring the idea that object-based and space-based 
attention are related to vision-for-perception and vision-for-action, respectively.
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one object is processed and others are ignored, and there 
is no affordance interference. In the case of experiments 
described in this paper, participants focused their attention 
either on the global level or on the local one. In each case, 
one level was ignored. There was no divided attention. 
Thus, interaction of affordances was probably restricted.   
One way to test the hypothesis that focused attention 
prevents affordances from interfering would be to employ 
the ‘divided attention’ paradigm because it allows the 
perceptual global advantage effect to be seen in compound 
stimuli processing (see for instance Miler and Navon, 2002). 
In contrast to the focused attention paradigm utilized in this 
experiment, in the divided attention condition the participant 
is asked to monitor both levels of the hierarchically 
organised stimulus so no one level is ignored. The task for 
participants this time is not to decide whether object on 
certain level is X or Y but whether a certain object (e.g., 
X) is present or not present - somewhere in the compound 
stimuli. Thereby, in the divided attention paradigm for 
perceptual global processing, the task has strictly the 
character of a visual search. As noted above in this case, 
perceptual global advantage (both global precedence and 
global interference) does occur. Hence, the hypothesis is 
that when processing compound stimuli, similar to the 
ones described in this paper, affordances would probably 
interfere in a condition of divided attention. 
The second factor that could potentially have caused 
the lack of interference between global processing 
and affordances is a responding method, consisting in 
performance of certain motor action. Usually interference 
between different affordances is revealed if the participant 
needs to perform a movement of the whole hand (i.e., 
reaching) and not mere button pressing with fi  ngers (e.g., 
Tipper et al., 1997). Additionally, reaching and grasping 
relates to visuo-motor processes other than simple pointing 
and/or pressing the button (see Pavese and Buxbaum, 
2002). In the experiments presented above, participants 
did not reach and grasp cups; instead, they performed only 
button pressing although their fi  ngers were shaped as if they 
were holding the cup by its handle. As it was mentioned 
earlier, the preparation of motor action infl uences detection 
and the discrimination of certain features of viewed objects 
(see Craighero et al., 1999). Thus, it is possible that this 
alignment of  fi  ngers could have reciprocally enhanced 
affordance of the cup handle and caused concurrent 
affordance to be unattended. Additionally, affordance 
enhancement combined with focused attention (on one 
level of compound stimulus only) resulted in the competing 
affordance being ignored. Although it poses some technical 
diffi culties, it would be worthwhile to verify this hypothesis 
by conducting this experiment in a way that participants 
should respond by performing a whole movement (starting 
from a neutral resting position) of reaching and grasping, 
while attention conditions are being controlled. Perhaps 
in such a situation, when visually guided movement 
is generated on-line and there is no prepared and pre-
programmed motor action, affordances of target objects 
and those of objects from another aspect of a compound 
stimulus would compete and cause interference.
The discussed alignment of fi  ngers while responding, 
which potentially leads to enhancement of affordances, 
relates to another issue, a more theoretical one. One may 
refl ect that actually, when someone looks at everyday familiar 
object and considers its effective grasping (i.e., grasping a 
cup by its handle) this is an example of interaction between 
the functioning of the ventral and dorsal streams (see 
Creem and Proffi tt, 2001). Hence, as described in the above 
experiments, the imposing affordances effect (as looking at 
cups and their handles) and Navon effect would be in fact 
‘interaction in interaction’ or interaction only within vision-
for-perception (and then only within the ventral stream). 
Such case might occur because recognition of everyday 
objects is the effect of the ventral stream functioning as 
it is also perceptual global precedence. However, it seems 
reasonable to claim that hand positioning counterbalances 
this and allows the shift of these affordances used in 
these experiments back to vision-for-action functioning 
and resumes the distinction between ventral and dorsal 
processing. Nevertheless, probably a more accurate design 
with more sensitive measures is needed, which will clearly 
distinguish these functions and processes.
As demonstrated in this study, lack of interference 
between affordances from different levels of hierarchically 
organized stimuli suggests that processes of perceptual 
global advantage and processing of affordances are 
independent or separated. When someone looks at a 
graspable object and focuses his/her attention on it, 
potential motor actions that can be performed on that object 
are quickly extracted and activated. Simultaneously, when 
that object is a part of a larger whole that might be a subject 
of global processing, these processes are restricted only to 
perceptual operations and have no effect on visuo-motor 
performance. It seems that processes of vision for action 
(here extracting affordances) are faster than processes of 
vision for perception (here perceptual global advantage). 
This in turn confi rms the assumption that the fi  rst is related 
to the functioning of the dorsal stream in the brain and 
the latter to that of the ventral stream, due to claims that 
neuronal performance of the dorsal stream in the brain 
is faster than that of the ventral stream (see Milner and 
Goodale, 1995). It should be borne in mind, however, that in 
this study, certain motor actions were pre-programmed and 
could have infl uenced the pace of visuo-motor processing, 
making it faster. 
Results obtained in this study are in line with the theory 
of Milner and Goodale. It is important to emphasize, 
though, that certain theoretical considerations should not 
be misinterpreted. Hughes et al. (2005) state that global 
and local processing might infl uence dissociations between 
perception and action. Although their claim might not seem 
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odd, it is rather inappropriate to interpret theory as they do 
by stating that global/local processing is something above 
or beyond the distinction between perception and action. 
Global/local processing is a perceptual characteristic and 
should be treated as such (and in empirical terms, this is 
what these researchers do). Furthermore, it is obvious that 
perception can modulate its relationship to action. However, 
the multiplication of possible explanations is unjustifi ed.
The imposition of the Navon effect and the affordances 
effect was intended to study the potential interaction 
between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action, 
although it turned out that this method brings similar 
effects as studies using the technique of ‘grasping of visual 
illusions’. Nonetheless, experiments from this study avoid 
some of the problems that experiments with illusions 
have faced. For example, it is not the case that there are 
two different tasks addressing two different functions of 
vision – perception and action. Hierarchically organised 
objects with their affordances appear to be good stimuli 
for demonstrating the separation of vision-for-perception 
and vision-for-action using behavioural measures. It would 
be interesting to further explore this case of the lack of 
interference of affordances in compound stimuli and verify 
it using techniques allowing it to be measured at the level 
of brain functioning. 
Although the main result suggests independence 
between perceptual global processing and affordances 
processing, many factors from the present study suggest 
that an important role in the potential interaction between 
vision-for-perception and vision-for-action is played 
by visual attention. It seems that such interaction is not 
possible without attention. This notion however, requires 
further studies.
This independence or separation of affordance extraction 
from processes related to perceptual organisation seems to 
be reasonable. In the real world, many objects with many 
affordances surrounds us and these objects very often 
cluster and form groups. If the processes of perceptual 
organisation (like the Navon effect or perceptual Gestalt 
laws), apart from the arranging of visual information in 
order to form coherent internal representation, also leads 
to the combination of affordances of visually grouped 
objects, it is very likely that it would cause an overload in 
visual processing. Thus the fast and effi cient performance 
on seen objects would be disabled. The separation of 
perceptual grouping from affordance extraction allows 
effective adaptation and visuo-motor interaction with the 
environment. 
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1  normal  right  normal  right  yes  yes
2  normal  right  normal  left  yes  no
3  normal  left  normal  left  yes  yes
4  normal  left  normal  right  yes  no
5  normal  right  inverted  right  no  yes
6  normal  right  inverted  left  no  no
7  normal  left  inverted  left  no  yes
8  normal  left  inverted  right  no  no
9  inverted  right  inverted  right  yes  yes
10  inverted  right  inverted  left  yes  no
11  inverted  left  inverted  left  yes  yes
12  inverted  left  inverted  right  yes  no
13  inverted  right  normal  right  no  yes
14  inverted  right  normal  left  no  no
15  inverted  left  normal  left  no  yes
16  inverted  left  normal  right  no  no
APPENDIX
List of stimuli types used in Experiments 1 and 2.
Stimulus No Global object 
position
Global 
object handle 
orientation
Local objects 
position
Local objects 
handle 
orientation
Congruence of 
objects positions 
between levels
Congruence of 
objects handle 
orientations 
between levels
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